For the Court, in a few pithy paragraphs, declared that it was obvious from the preamble of the Adequacy Decision that it was taken for reasons related to US security and that, since the Data Protection Directive contained an exception for data transmission for security reasons, it was ultra vires the Community to adopt the Adequacy Decision and the closely related international agreement. In other words, the Parliament was right in having the PNR agreement annulled, but as it was not a "1 st Pillar" domain, the Parliament had nothing to do with it.
The Court's judgment sheds no light whatsoever on the question under whose "vires", in whose power these measures would belong, though AdvocateGeneral Leger had suggested the third pillar. And that is the choice the Commission made in reaction to the Court's judgment, but it is not self-evident, since the third pillar would seem to require co-operation between Member States in the criminal field while it is an agreement with the US we are talking about here. So, second Pillar?
Hence we are confronted in the external relations domain, not only with the border between first and second pillar, but also between second and third.
Why this should be important, is clear, once we realize that in Amsterdam and
Nice the Court's jurisdiction over the third pillar has been extended (also through declarations Member States have made under Article 35(2) TEU), whilst the second pillar has been entirely excluded from the Court's jurisdiction (This would still have been the case under the Constitution, see Article …).
This, in the absence of an equivalent to Article 47 TEU to protect the third pillar from encroachment by the second…
Convergence between the Pillars
Anticipating on the next room we will move on to, the one with the exposition on Community powers and Member State powers, we now come to an area where recently the relationship between Community and Member State powers has transfigured into the relationship between the first and second pillar.
As you may know, there is a strong tendency in the Council to make certain clauses in the broad international agreements, such as cooperation Parenthetically I should say here that this was and is one of the big weaknesses of the Constitution. It has always been a mystery to me how the Union was supposed to conclude international agreements spanning both the CFSP and the Community domain and uphold the integrity of both pillars.
But then, just as Vasari was not always capable of appreciating the art of certain of his contemporaries -for instance he did not appreciate Botticelli very much; he dismissed the "Primavera" and the "Birth of Venus" as "paintings of nude women", be it "expressed with grace", so we may not be fully able now to appreciate the design of the Constitution in all its glory.
Practical cross-pillar cooperation
One thing is certain, it has recently turned out to be easier to find Another interesting challenge in the field of external representation to which the Union had to respond recently was thrust upon it by the reform of the United Nations, in particular by the creation of the Peace-building Commission.
You will recall that this is the UN Commission that will be charged with postconflict peace-building and recovery, involving reconstruction and institutionbuilding with a view to laying the foundation for sustainable development, to use the words of the so-called World Summit outcome document.
This Peace-Building Commission in reality consists of different formations:
• In the Organisational Committee, the Commission will participate on behalf of the European Community as an "institutional donor", in accordance with paragraph 9 of the GA and SC resolutions establishing the PBC. The
Presidency and the SG/HR will be associated with the European Community's delegation.
• In the country-specific meetings, the Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, will participate representing the EU as a "relevant regional organisation", in association with the European Community as "institutional donor" in a common delegation. It is all convoluted and as yet untested; nevertheless it has the great advantage of having been agreed well in advance of the start of work of the Peace-Building Commission and to show a real wish to make Community and CFSP sides of the Union collaborate in pragmatic fashion.
Conclusion
What have we seen in the first room, the one with the three pillars?
Ultimately, the pillars are not in themselves a brilliant work of art. They have to carry a common vault, while maintaining their own identity and separateness, and where one pillar -the Community one -seems more valued and is better protected than the two others. It turns out to be easier to combine the pillars when the common vault can be pragmatically put together, as is the case in external representation. It becomes much more difficult if the common vault has to be a strictly legal construction, since then the requirements of Union coherence and maintenance of the separate character of each pillar lead to an architectural riddle which still defies any clean solution.
III. The Second Room: Relations between EC and Member States
We are now venturing into the second room, and here I would like to comment on some developments in the ECJ's jurisprudence on the relations between the show that a proper application of the ERTA doctrine how to construe external Community powers remains a practical challenge that transcends the narrow issue of pure legal "deduction" whether Community competence is "affected" or not. The Court' approach is to be praised for being nuanced, but that makes it not always easy to apply by the other Institutions on a prospective basis.
IV. The Third Room: EC Participation in international organisations
We are now entering the third room and turning to the multilateral arena. One of the most significant recent developments relates to the status of the Community in international organizations. As the Community's external powers gradually evolve in many policy fields, they are more and more exercised in those international organizations that are dealing with these matters. Let me give you two concrete examples, one on trade and one drawing from the internal market. The Court of First Instance rejected the claim in December last year. It argued that such action would jeopardize the margin of manoeuvre the Community enjoys under the WTO system to remove incompatibilities only after a certain time, during which US sanctions are entitled to cross-retaliate. The company had brought forward an additional claim, namely liability of the Community in the absence of an unlawful act. Here, the idea is that the company face "unusual and special" damage in facing the US cross retaliation. While finding a general principle common to all Member States to that effect, the Tribunal ruled that the risk of cross-retaliation belongs to the normal risks of an exporter, thereby denying the existence of an "unusual and special" damage. The case is now pending on appeal before the Court of Justice. We keep our fingers crossed. Seen from the perspective of the Commission, I can say that it is ready to positively engage with the other Institutions and the Member States, as it has shown in its Communication "Europe in the World -Some Practical Proposals
